SCSPBP2: Generic Windows Service Protection

Article:TECH141286  |  Created: 2010-10-05  |  Updated: 2010-11-12  |  Article URL
Article Type
Technical Solution







The out-of-the-box CSP policies provide significant protection against these buffer overflows, as they do against any type of injected code. No policy updates are necessary. As soon as the injected code attempts behavior that is not normal for the program it was injected into, CSP blocks that behavior. Since the goal of most attacks is to use the program's privileges in unauthorized ways, most attacks will be blocked. Some specific examples:
  • All CSP policies block services from modifying critical Windows files or registry values. So if the attack code tries to damage the system, it won’t be able to.
  • All CSP policies block incoming network connections by default, thus preventing access to this vulnerability from remote systems. If inbound network connections are required, the customer must configure the policy to allow specific remote networks to connect. Unknown (and potentially malicious) remote systems would still be blocked.
  • All CSP policies block services from writing executables to disk and from launching suspicious programs. So if the attack code tries to download and run a Trojan program, it won't be able to launch the Trojan. This is true whether the attack is made via this vulnerability or any other method and whether it is injected from a remote system or a malicious local program.
By default the CSP policies allow services read access to most of the file system. To protect against information disclosure vulnerabilities, customers can configure the policy so some services cannot even read certain files or folders. This would be appropriate for sensitive areas of the file system that are not normally accessed by the programs and would further limit the damage that information disclosure attacks could cause.

Article URL

Terms of use for this information are found in Legal Notices