We’ve been analyzing W32.Stuxnet, which is a threat that uses a legitimate digital certificate from a major third party and takes advantage of a previously unknown bug in Windows; ultimately, it searches for SCADA systems and design documents. The findings of our analysis are being documented in a series of blog articles.

Stuxnet contacts two remote servers for command and control, and until last week those domains were pointing to a server hosted in Malaysia. Once we identified those domains, we redirected traffic away from the C&C servers thereby preventing them from controlling the infected machines and retrieving stolen information.

Within the past 72 hours we've seen close to 14,000...

W32.Stuxnet has received a lot of media attention over the last few days. This incident provides almost a complete case study of how these attacks succeed and how they will probably be used in the future. A successful attack allowed the attacker to steal confidential SCADA design and usage documents.

Let’s start by saying we don’t know who is behind the attack, and historically discovering this is very rare. However, if someone proposed this type of attack a month ago, while we would have agreed it was theoretically possible, most would have dismissed such an attack as a movie-plot scenario. Furthermore, attacks of this nature are rarely disclosed publicly.

We know that the people behind this attack aren’t amateurs, but their final motive is unclear.

The principal facts in this case are:

• The attackers discovered and used a zero-day...