The Internet is home to billions of computers, all of which performthe jobs they have been programmed to do. Each of these computers has ahard drive and RAM. It’s a rare case that either is completely full. Abillion computers, each with a couple spare megabytes, works out to afew terabytes in a very conservative estimate.
There are several ways that this space can be harnessed to varyingdegrees, depending on what the ultimate goal of an attacker is. A tinybit of RAM on a large number of computers can be used to store secretdata that an attacker wants to hide, while a lot of information can bestored on some servers at the risk of being found and removed.Harnessing this space is often referred to as "parasitic storage."
One parasitic storage technique, called "juggling," can be used forextremely sensitive or illegal information. The goal for the attackeris to ensure that the complete body of information is never on theircomputer all at once, but that part of it is...
The default install of OpenBSD is well known to have one of the mostsecure default installations available. The OpenBSD team hastraditionally enjoyed the luxury of claiming to have only a singleremotely exploitable vulnerability the past 10 years. However, CoreSecurity recently discovered a new vulnerability in the IPv6 stack of OpenBSD. As a result, the OpenBSD project had to change the text on their main page to: “Only two remote holes in the default install, in more than 10 years!”
A buffer overflow may be triggered when a fragmented IPv6 packet isreceived. Although this was originally thought by the vendor to be nomore than a denial of service issue, a proof of concept exploit wasdeveloped, proving that the vulnerability is exploitable. The totaltime elapsed between the vulnerability being initially disclosed toOpenBSD and the fix being...
