Video Screencast Help
Search Video Help Close Back
to help
New in the Rewards Catalog: Vouchers for "Symantec Technical Specialist" and "Symantec Certified Specialist" exams.

Security Response

Showing posts tagged with Security Response remove filter
Showing posts by John McDonald remove filter
John McDonald | 30 Jun 2011 | 0 comments

Microsoft 社にいる友人が最近、同社で Popureb と呼ばれているカテゴリから見つかった、ブートキットのトロイの木馬の新しい亜種に関するブログ記事を書いています。この亜種 Win32/Popureb.E は、悪質なマスターブートレコード(MBR)や他の悪質なコンポーネントの除去を妨げるドライバコンポーネントを組み込みます。

Microsoft 社のブログに書かれた以下の 1 文が意味するところをすばやく察知したテクニカルライターがいます。

「お使いのシステムが Trojan:Win32/Popureb.E に感染した場合は、Windows 回復コンソールを使って MBR を修復し、MBR を正常な状態に復元することをお勧めします」

pcmag.com で、「Microsoft's Answer to Vicious Malware? Reinstall Windows(悪質なマルウェアに関する Microsoft の回答は、やはり Windows の再インストールなのか)」と題する記事を書いた Mark Hachman 氏です。この記事で同氏は、Symantec Connect サイトのブログ記事に言及しており、これは一見するとシマンテックの社員が書いたものに見える可能性があります。Symantec Connect サイトに慣れていないとちょっと紛らわしいかもしれないので、少し整理しておこうと思います。

シマンテックのスタッフによってシマンテック公式ブログに投稿された記事にアクセスするには、いくつかの方法があります。ここではそのうちの 2 つをご紹介します。

www.symantec.com/connect/...

John McDonald | 30 Jun 2011 | 0 comments

先日、このブログの別の担当者から、6 月のマイクロソフト月例パッチで公開された脆弱性のひとつが現在悪用され、被害が出ているという報告がありました。こうした場合の常として、シマンテックでは何が起きるかを観察するために、ハニーポットコンピュータでこの悪用による危殆化を再現してみることにしました。

この悪用について最初に注目したのは、調査のために転送されてきた、あるユーザー宛の電子メールメッセージです。このメッセージは利用者の多い Web メールサービス上にホストされているアカウントから送信され、送信者は中国の大学生と称していますが、文法は誤りだらけでした。メールは、特定の話題について助言を求める内容か、最近のプレゼンテーションについて受信者に謝意を述べたうえでそのプレゼンテーションについて質問するというものです。ある中華レストランへのリンクが掲載されていますが、リンク先のこの Web ページに、Internet Explorer 8 に伴う脆弱性の悪用が仕掛けられています。

図 1: cnzz へのリンクに加え、統計目的と思われる隠し iframe タグが確認できる

本件のシナリオは、いわゆる「標的型攻撃」と表現することもできますが、どの攻撃も程度の差こそあれ巧妙化してきているので、「標的型」かどうかという定義も、ケースに応じて変わりがちです。今回の場合、受信者が中国人ではなく、大学ともまったく無関係であり、まして助言を請われている話題にも、言及されているプレゼンテーションにもまったく心当たりがないことから考えると、なぜメール本文をもっと受信者に該当しそうな内容に直さなかったのか、という疑問が残ります。このメールが見つかった状況としては明らかに場違いであり、...

John McDonald | 29 Jun 2011 | 0 comments

A colleague of mine recently wrote about one of the June “Microsoft Tuesday” vulnerabilities being exploited in the wild. Because we're a bit like that, we decided to allow the exploit to compromise one of our honeypot computers so we could observe what happened.

The exploit first came to our attention by way of email messages that were initially sent to a customer and then passed on to us for investigation. These messages were sent from an account hosted on a popular webmail service, contained very bad grammar, and were purportedly sent by a Chinese university student. The emails either asked for advice on a particular topic, or thanked the recipient for a recent presentation and included a question related to that presentation. The emails included a link to a Chinese restaurant and the destination Web page contained the exploit for an Internet Explorer 8 vulnerability:...

John McDonald | 29 Jun 2011 | 0 comments

Our friends at Microsoft recently blogged about a new variant of a bootkit Trojan from the family they call Popureb. The variant, Win32/Popureb.E, introduced a driver component to prevent a malicious master boot record (MBR) and other malicious components from being cleaned.

At least one tech writer was quick to pick up on the implications of the following sentence from the Microsoft blog:

"If your system is infected with Trojan:Win32/Popureb.E, we advise fixing the MBR  using the Windows Recovery Console to return the MBR to a clean state."

Mark Hachman wrote an article for pcmag.com entitled "Microsoft's Answer to Vicious Malware? Reinstall Windows." In the article, Mark refers to a blog post on the Symantec Connect site that at first glance may appear to...

John McDonald | 15 Jun 2010 | 0 comments

Recap

If you missed Parts I and II of this blog series, you can find them here and here. I finished Part II promising to reveal the organization behind this sorry saga.
 
Following the trail

The trail really wasn’t very hard to follow. When we looked up some of the IP addresses from the Active Connections listing (in Part II), we found some interesting results:

This one appeared in both lists (along with several other addresses in the same subnet); the list from Derek’s computer and the one from our virus lab machine. It was also the top generator of traffic on our virus lab machine (we didn’t take such stats from Derek’s pc). Doing a...

John McDonald | 11 Jun 2010 | 0 comments

Recap

I left off promising to reveal the mysterious application that was consuming my friend Derek’s bandwidth and trying to figure out how it got on his computer in the first place. Please note that all images (except one from this point on) were not actually taken from Derek’s computer, but instead were captured from a recreation of events using a honeypot computer inside our virus lab, and therefore may not accurately reflect what exactly took place on Derek’s machine.
 
Recalling events

Roughly a week prior to asking for my help, Derek had been surfing the Web, reading blogs, chatting with friends, and checking out some of his favorite sites as usual. That day he came across a video trailer for a movie that had just been released and decided to watch it. After downloading it onto his computer—which, as...

John McDonald | 02 Jun 2010 | 0 comments

Introduction

We post a lot of blogs here about all kinds of threats, including pervasive botnets, rootkits, rogue apps, the latest flavor of spam doing the rounds, and so on and so forth. So, for a change I thought I’d talk about something a bit more personal that happened closer to home—something that happened to a good friend of mine. Not a gruesome tale by any means, but one that will hopefully be of interest to some of our less technical readers who may be able to identify with my friend’s plight. I’ve separated the story into three sections and will post them here a few days apart, each containing links to their preceding posting so anyone who missed one can easily catch up.
 
Part I – Discovery
 
A call for help

A friend of mine, Derek, recently asked me if I could help him figure out why his Internet connection had been running so slowly for the...

John McDonald | 03 May 2010 | 0 comments

Email hoaxes are nothing new, dating back at least as far as 1994 with what is widely believed to have been the first email hoax—referred to as the "Goodtimes virus" or the "Goodtimes virus hoax" after the subject of the email. The message in the early version was short and to the point, advising recipients not to open email messages with the subject "Good Times" because doing so would ruin their files. This, of course, was not true, but in cases where the recipient complied with the warning, it obviously had the effect of ruining their chances of actually reading any legitimate email messages with that very subject.

Before email, normal postal mail (known fondly by many as "snail-mail") chain-letter hoaxes regularly did the rounds, and sometimes still do even today. The difference between a simple hoax and a chain-letter hoax is that the latter encourages the recipient to forward the letter or email on to others, usually family...

John McDonald | 11 Apr 2010 | 0 comments

Almost a year has passed since we last blogged about a new undocumented vulnerability in JustSystems’ Ichitaro software and along with the ever stunning new pink and white blossoms of spring, 2010’s first offering has surfaced. As we have reported on several occasions over the years (see below) Ichitaro is a popular word processing program in Japan.

Justsystem's Ichitaro zero-day used to propogate Trojan (August 16th, 2006)
New fiscal year in Japan, new zero-day in Justsystem's Ichitaro (April 7th, 2007)
Unknown Exploit Compromises Ichitaro (August 2nd, 2007)
...

John McDonald | 21 Dec 2009 | 0 comments

Theft
As we discussed in Part I, the primary purpose of Qakbot is to steal information from the compromised computer. In addition to targeting login details for FTP, POP3 and IMAP, the worm also attempts to steal Cookies - not only regular browser session cookies but also Flash cookies. A discussion of Flash cookies is beyond the scope of this article, but be aware that unlike traditional browser cookies, Flash cookies are not controlled through the cookie privacy controls in a browser which means they cannot be cleared or deleted in the simple manner that normal tracking cookies are removed.

Qakbot uses several techniques to collect private keys from the system certificates contained on the compromised computer. First, it replaces all certificate-related dialog boxes so that the “OK” button is automatically pushed as soon as the dialog is created...