Symantec Connect
  • Login
  • Register
  • All of Connect
    • All of Connect
    • Backup and Archiving
    • Endpoint Management & Virtualization
    • Storage and Clustering
    • Security
    • Inside Symantec
    • Vision User Conference
    • Partners
    • Developers
    •  
  • Overview
  • Forums
  • Articles
  • Blogs
  • Downloads
  • Events
  • Videos
  • Groups
  • Ideas

Security Response: Showing posts tagged with Security Response: Showing posts by Nicolas FalliereSyndicate content

Login to participate
Inside Trojan.Clampi: The Research Paper
Nicolas Falliere | November 10, 2009
0 comments

Trojan.Clampi is an interesting threat, which we described in many blog entries over the past month. We’ve now compiled these entries, along with some new material, into a research paper—Inside the Jaws of Trojan.Clampi.

In a nutshell, Clampi is an Infostealer threat. Its executable can be seen as a host for separate modules, containing the real payloads of the threat. These modules are heavily protected from reverse-engineering as well. The functionalities range from banking-site password stealing, to local credential gathering, to a SOCKS proxy. The communication with Clampi’s command & control servers, the “Gates”, uses HTTP and is encrypted. Clampi...

Read more
Tags: Endpoint Protection (AntiVirus), Emerging Threats, Evolution of Security, Malicious Code, Security, Security Response
Inside Trojan.Clampi: Bypassing your Local Firewall
Nicolas Falliere | October 26, 2009
0 comments

Clampi goes to unusual measures to bypass the local firewall on the compromised computer, such as the Windows Firewall. Usually, such firewalls allow only specific programs to communicate using specific ports and protocols. For instance, your browser would be allowed to use outbound TCP port 80.

As we’ve previously discussed, Clampi needs to communicate with a “Gate” gateway server in order to get its orders and send information. Any firewall would block the program if it tried to connect to the outside world. Bypassing this can be done in many ways, the most common one in the malware world being to add an entry in the Windows registry, added the program to the trusted file list.

The Clampi gang decided to inject their networking code into Internet Explorer, which is granted Web access by any standard firewall configuration out there. Fair enough—that’s another approach, but not a new one. Yet you’ve seen these guys don’t do...

Read more
Tags: Evolution of Security, Malicious Code, Security, Security Response
Inside Trojan.Clampi: Network Modules
Nicolas Falliere | October 23, 2009
0 comments

Today, we’ll discuss the two remaining Clampi modules used for replication and traffic relay capabilities. The SOCKS module is very straight-forward—it’s a SOCKS proxy server. Normal SOCKS proxy servers act as a connection relays and are used for many purposes, such as connection filtering, passing traffic through firewalls, or to maintain anonymity.

The server’s code is injected into an instance of Internet Explorer. It then listens for incoming connections on a random TCP port above 5000. The SOCKS module is activated in response to a control server’s command. The client then sends the port it’s listening on for inbound connections to the proxy server:

blog-5-image-1.JPG

In the above example, the SOCKS server will be listening to port 38329 (which is 0x95B9 in hexadecimal base).

Usually, relay servers like...

Read more
Tags: Malicious Code, Security, Security Response
Inside Trojan.Clampi: Enhanced Logging
Nicolas Falliere | October 20, 2009
0 comments

This chapter in our Clampi saga brings us back to the malware’s logging facility. As we saw before, one of Clampi’s modules, codenamed LOGGER, is responsible for logging outgoing information going to a determined list of URLs – stored in a data file as CRCs.

One problem arises with banking sites that preprocess the user’s personal information before sending it over HTTPS—it’s done using client-side JavaScript.  For instance, a hash of the input PIN number could be sent instead of the PIN number itself. This mechanism adds an extra layer of security, preventing malware from sniffing network traffic at one end of the SSL tunnel. But still, it’s only covering one end. It’s more secure than no encryption, but still not great. At least two methods exist to get around this:

  • Setting up a keylogger using either software (...
Read more
Tags: Endpoint Protection (AntiVirus), Emerging Threats, Evolution of Security, Malicious Code, Security, Security Response
Inside Trojan.Clampi: Stealing Your Information
Nicolas Falliere | October 16, 2009
0 comments

Let’s continue our Trojan.Clampi blog series by discussing three more modules downloaded and executed by Clampi. These modules share the common goal of gathering information, private or not, contained on the compromised computer. They don’t intercept network traffic like the Logger module does (described in my previous blog).

The PROT module
This module gathers private information from several sources, including Protected Storage (PStore), which contains user credentials stored by Internet Explorer or Outlook for instance. Interestingly, it also sets specific registry values in order to facilitate the creation of new entries in the PStore.
For instance, it sets the following registry entires:

  • HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main\ “...
Read more
Tags: Endpoint Protection (AntiVirus), Emerging Threats, Evolution of Security, Malicious Code, Security, Security Response
Inside Trojan.Clampi: The Logger Module
Nicolas Falliere | October 12, 2009
0 comments

As mentioned in our previous blog entry, most of the Trojan.Clampi features reside in separate modules that are sent by a remote server in response to clients’ queries. In this part of this blog series, we’ll have a look at one of the modules used by the malware to steal login credentials mostly from banking Web sites.
 
This module is codenamed LOGGER by the threat. After decryption, the beginning of the module’s raw data looks like this (compressed):

blog-2-image-1.jpg

To avoid downloading the module each time Clampi runs, it is stored in the registry (in an encrypted form) in a value named “Mxx”, where “xx” is a zero-based number...

Read more
Tags: Endpoint Protection (AntiVirus), Emerging Threats, Evolution of Security, Malicious Code, Security, Security Response
Inside Trojan.Clampi: Network Communication
Nicolas Falliere | October 6, 2009
0 comments

Trojan.Clampi is one of the hottest malware around, and as such, received a fair amount of media coverage, as well as technical reports describing some of its functionalities. As part of our ongoing blog series, we will be discussing interesting and rarely presented aspects of Clampi. Today, we’ll introduce an important aspect of Clampi: the network communication.

First of all, if you’re not familiar with this malware already, Clampi is a Trojan horse whose main purpose is to steal private information: user passwords, login credentials, software licenses, credit card numbers, bank account information, etc. Note that Clampi’s operations are performed by helper modules, downloaded by the main executable, and stored in the Windows registry.

Once the threat is installed on a computer, it connects to one of the gateway servers listed in the registry value “GatesList...

Read more
Tags: Endpoint Protection (AntiVirus), Emerging Threats, Evolution of Security, Malicious Code, Security, Security Response
Peacomm spam finally "gets right to the point"
Nicolas Falliere | September 14, 2007
0 comments

Peacomm samples - the so-called Storm worm- started sending unusual spam yesterday. For once, the mail did notcontain a hard-coded IP address linking to fake videos, pseudo Torclients or NFL "tracker programs". The spam advertises a website,http://www.vs-amounts.net:

From: xxx@yyy.com
To: victim@domain.com
Subject: Cold Hard Cash!

Seeking highly motivated individuals interested in a unique opportunity in financial services.

Building an exciting career where you determine your own hours and compensations.

http://www.vs-amounts.net/

Hmm. Already this looksvery suspicious, but let's check that link anyway. The site hostsphpbb, a popular open-source PHP-based Bulletin Board, and opensdirectly to the following announcement message:

OK...

Read more
Tags: Endpoint Protection (AntiVirus), Security, Spam, Security Response
The new Peacomm infection techniques
Nicolas Falliere | August 23, 2007
0 comments

The latest variants of Peacomm, detected as Trojan.Peacomm.C (or proactively, as the usual Trojan.Packed.13), have introduced some interesting changes in the way they infect a machine.

As was written in a previous blog entry ,Peacomm spam entices users to visit a Web page containing a link to afile applet.exe. This Web page also embeds an obfuscated JavaScriptroutine that tries to exploit a Windows Media Player vulnerability, incase the user decided – very wisely – not to download and run the socalled “Secure Login Applet”. If the vulnerability is exploitedsuccessfully, a small file will be downloaded on the compromisedmachine, which will in turn download applet.exe. Both files aredetected as Trojan.Packed.13...

Read more
Tags: Endpoint Protection (AntiVirus), Malicious Code, Security, Security Response
TP13 forever
Nicolas Falliere | August 22, 2007
0 comments

Trojan.Packed.13,or TP13 as we call it internally, is associated with some of the mostwidespread malware in 2007. Though its heuristic detection may beobscure, its related threats are now well-known: Trojan.Mespam,Trojan.Galapoper, and more importantly, the infamous Trojan.Peacommfamily of P2P malware.

Simply put, it consists of a set of heuristics to detect Trojansprotected with an unknown packer. We didn’t have a name, so we gave itthe number 13… Bad luck, perhaps, either for us or its authors.

This packer has several features that differentiate it from others.It is widespread, very frequently updated, and uses originalanti-emulation tricks to fool anti-virus software detections (such asdummy loops calling obscure Windows APIs). The packer is not publiclyavailable and we analyze it indirectly through threats that use it.Malicious files are usually repacked...

Read more
Tags: Endpoint Protection (AntiVirus), Malicious Code, Security, Security Response
WordPress XSS Exploit Solves Problems… and Creates More!
Nicolas Falliere | August 1, 2007
0 comments

A proof-of-concept code exploiting newly discovered XSSvulnerabilities for the latest version of Wordpress (2.2.1) was postedtoday on a security blog.

The researcher unveiled seven vulnerabilities, cross-site scripting(XSS) or SQL injections, whose consequences range from benign toserious, the critical ones potentially leading to blog compromising. Inhis haste to show his skills, this person also released aproof-of-concept (PoC) code exploiting one of these vulnerabilities.

The PoC in itself, as explained, is supposedly not malicious, and isdesigned to raise awareness and patch vulnerable versions of theWordPress publishing platform. In a few words, here’s how it works:

  • A WordPress administrator browses the “Comments manager” in the administration panel
  • She clicks a link, which redirects to the PoC author’s Web page.This page checks the referrer, to see whether it might originate from alogged-on WordPress administrator (the URL would contain...
Read more
Tags: Endpoint Protection (AntiVirus), Security, Vulnerabilities & Exploits, Security Response
Beware of LZH
Nicolas Falliere | June 25, 2007
0 comments

Though the discovery of Microsoft Officezero-day exploits has dropped dramatically in the last six months, newfile format exploits are still being discovered (and exploited)regularly. After .zip and .rar file exploits, the latest archive formatvulnerability affects the Lhaca archiver and its LZH compressionsupport. While not very well known in the US and Europe, Lhaca appearsto be a popular archive tool in Japan, as is the compression format LZH.

On Friday, June 22nd, one of our Japanese customers submitted an.lzh file. The file in question, after quick analysis, raised immediatesuspicion. It contained several NOP-sleds, shell code-like code blocks,decryptors, and an encoded executable in the archive itself! All theingredients required by file format exploit recipes. The difficulty inthis case is finding the application that could be vulnerable. Cheersto Masaki Suenaga in Security Response, Japan for doing the initialanalysis and finding out that...

Read more
Tags: Endpoint Protection (AntiVirus), Security, Vulnerabilities & Exploits, Security Response
ANI to the Extreme
Nicolas Falliere | April 27, 2007
0 comments

A few days ago, we received yet anothersubmission containing a strange Animated Cursor file. Thisvulnerability made quite some noise, and though we thought it washandled by now, this file was definitely not the usual ANI exploit…

An ANI file follows the RIFF standard, with a few exceptions. It isa collection of data chunks, all having the same format of "header |size | data". Therefore, spotting malicious files attempting to exploitthe vulnerability should be easy. But is it? For the human eye, it is.For a heuristic detection, in spite of what was said before, it is not.Despite the supposedly easy structure of the Animated Cursor file,Microsoft’s implementation of its parser is quite loose.

First, invalid chunks will get properly parsed. Though not affectingthe ANI file itself, such chunks should not be encountered in cursorfiles, but the ANI parser just allows and skips them. Fair enough, ourdetections can handle that as well. Attackers, after a...

Read more
Tags: Endpoint Protection (AntiVirus), Security, Vulnerabilities & Exploits, Security Response

About Security Response Blog

Our security research centers around the world provide unparalleled analysis of and protection from malware, security risks, vulnerabilities, and spam.
Filter by:

Blog Tags

10.x 11.x 9.x and Earlier Antivirus2010 Backdoor.Tidserv Brightmail Gateway Emerging Threats Endpoint Encryption Endpoint Protection (AntiVirus) Endpoint Protection Small Business Enterprise Security Manager Evolution of Security General Symantec IT Healthcare Landscape IT Risk Management Internet Security Threat Report Live PC Care Malicious Code Misleading Applications Mobile & Wireless Online Fraud Password Management Restore Security Security Risks Spam Sykipot SymbOS.Exy Symbian Trojan.FakeAV Trojan.Zbot VirusDoctor Vulnerabilities & Exploits Windows Zeus
© 2010
  • Symantec Corporation
  • Contact Us
  • Get RSS
  • Privacy Policy
  • Symantec.com