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Showing posts tagged with Online Fraud
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Yazan Gable | 01 May 2007 07:00:00 GMT | 0 comments

Did you ever wonder how your credit card information is bought, soldor transferred? Have you ever wondered how someone uses your creditcard information after it is stolen to commit fraud? There are a numberof ways, but the preferred method is through using dumps. A dump is afile containing the data that is stored on a credit card’s magneticstrip. Dumps are the favorite currency of credit card fraud these days.

Carders, the people who deal in stolen credit card information andlaundering, pay premium prices for dumps. Premium is around $8.00 US,while simple credit card numbers, names and expiration dates are around$1.00 – 2.00 US. Sure, having a credit card number, name and expirydate work pretty well for on-line purchases, but the difficulty is ingetting the goods. Where should they be shipped to?

Dumps, on the other hand, allow the carder to dump the data ontopretty much any magnetic card. This includes hotel room keys, discountcards, gift cards, and other credit...

Zulfikar Ramzan | 27 Mar 2007 07:00:00 GMT | 0 comments

In a previous blog entry,I talked about the concept of a "drive-by pharming" attack. The conceptreceived significant traction, and in this blog entry, I wanted tofollow up on some of the commentary.

Recall that in a drive-by pharming attack, the attacker sets up aWeb page that simply when viewed attempts to connect to the victim’shome broadband router and change its DNS settings. If successful,future DNS requests made by the victim will be resolved by theattacker’s DNS server. As a result, the attacker controls the victim’sInternet connection, which allows the attacker to choose which sitesthe victim sees when he or she surfs the Web. The victim is nowsusceptible to phishing, identity theft, and a whole host of othersecurity issues.

Wired versus wireless
A number of people incorrectly thought that the...

Eric Chien | 16 Mar 2007 07:00:00 GMT | 0 comments

One of the principles behind malware is that it follows technologyand mainstream culture. If ninety percent of the world was using theEricOS, the vast majority of threats would be designed to run on theEricOS because otherwise the threat would have nothing to infect.

In China, online computer usage patterns affect the types of malwareSymantec sees there. In particular, if you walk into an Internet cafein China, rarely do you see people using search engines like Google oron Web sites like MySpace. Instead, the vast majority of people haveheadphones on and are playing online games such as Lineage or World ofWarcraft.

Thus, Symantec sees a lot of Infostealers that attempt to stealcredentials for these types of online games. Once credentials arestolen, the hacker logs into the account, steals the virtual items, andthen attempts to sell them for real money through various boardsoutside the virtual gaming world.

An example of this threat is Lingling (Lingling means...

Candid Wueest | 13 Mar 2007 07:00:00 GMT | 0 comments

Recently, some people received quite a shock while doing their normal online banking business, as reported by Heise news. While browsing their bank’s Web site, they suddenly noticed that an international phone number and a country flag were integrated into the transaction page.

From that point on, the reaction of different users will vary. You might call me pessimistic, but I assume some people would not question it (if they noticed it at all), and would continue with their normal online banking transactions. The same people might also fall for general phishing email attacks. Afterall, user awareness is not yet universal.

Security-savvy users, however, would identify this as a phishing attack of some sort and stop their current online banking session immediately (after taking some screenshots, of course). They would then call up the bank to tell them that a new kind of...

Liam O Murchu | 07 Mar 2007 08:00:00 GMT | 0 comments

On March 5, we posted a blog about a new threat called Trojan.Bayrob that targets users of the eBay auction site and, more specifically, motor auctions. Following further research, we are able to shed some more light on the mechanics of Trojan.Bayrob. As stated previously, this attack is targeted at users who will be highly likely to buy a car on eBay, (e.g. second-hand car sales companies).

In this attack, victims are sent an email about a car that is being offered for sale. The email contains a legitimate slide show program that shows images of the car on offer; however, the email also contains the Trojan.Bayrob file. Below are two examples of what the slide show looks like. While the victim views the slide show, the Trojan is...

Eric Chien | 07 Mar 2007 08:00:00 GMT | 0 comments

Symantec has recently received a phishing email that makes use of an interesting technique of hiding a phishing site URL. When receiving a suspected phishing message, one of the methods of determining if the embedded URLs are legitimate or not is to simply pass your cursor over the underlined hyperlink and then check the URL in the status bar of your browser. In the status bar, you can see if the link belongs to the appropriate domain or not.

Using Javascript, one can alter the text in the status bar. So, when browsing on the Web in general, this isn't always a reliable technique to verify the underlying URL. However, when receiving an HTML email in an email client (including Webmail), Javascript is generally neutered so it does not execute, preventing the obfuscation of the status bar via Javascript, making this technique more reliable. However, this phishing message we recently received is able to modify what is displayed in the status bar without the use...

Elia Florio | 07 Mar 2007 08:00:00 GMT | 0 comments

Windows Live is “everything you need, all in one place” and it looks like the search engine really does know what exactly it is that Italians need! Today, we came across a story that was reported by Sunbelt about a takeover of the Italian version of the Windows Live search engine. We decided to do a bit more investigating into those rumors.

At the moment, the problem is that when someone searches a combination of specific Italian keywords on the Windows Live portal, that person will always get a set of weird links in the search results. These weird links will most likely be related to the Linkoptimizer gang (aka Gromozon)—so this likely means that the Gromozon gang has managed to take over and manipulate the search results of Windows Live by getting their links to end up on the top of the search result lists.

...

Eric Chien | 06 Mar 2007 08:00:00 GMT | 0 comments

I recently received an email supposedly from the Anti-Scam Department of the British Secret Intelligence Service. They sent me an email because apparently my "email address signaled to our computer database today, with strong indication that you currently MIGHT be in a business transaction where you are a SCAM VICTIM unknowingly." Oh no!

In particular, they asked if I was:
• in a business transaction case that would claim millions of dollars
• told by a lottery company that I have successfully won millions
• told I had overdue contract funds
• promised to receive large sums of money in excess of millions of dollars
• promised to be awarded a contract worth millions or billions of dollars

If so, "there is a 99.99% chance that you are currently a victim of fraud/scam, run by notorious criminals known as con artists, with the sole aim of scamming and ripping you off your very hard earned funds!!" More importantly, I was...

Brian Hernacki | 27 Feb 2007 08:00:00 GMT | 0 comments

Today most of the identity oriented transactions on the Internet are done via plain old HTML forms and, if we're lucky, over SSL. And once again, something that seemed sufficient at first, is showing strain as usage grows. HTML/HTTP ends up providing a pretty clumsy and inadequate way to do identity transactions. It offers a poor user experience and wasn't really designed with security in mind. This has contributed to much of the grief over fraud, phishing, etc. Our primary defense mechanism against such threats has historically been the SSL certificate, but we know users don't read those. We also know users don't look too carefully at URLs (even when they are not obsfucated). Some of the...

Zulfikar Ramzan | 21 Feb 2007 08:00:00 GMT | 0 comments

In this blog entry, I’ll talk about where malicious software (or malware) can find its place within the lifecycle of phishing attacks. This material accompanies a recent panel I participated in during the American Association for the Advancement of Science Annual meeting. If you attended the panel, this blog will review the points I made. If you missed the panel, then hopefully you’ll get a sense for what I covered.

Phishing: Overview and Motivation. Recall that a phishing attack is one where some illegitimate entity sends you an email posing to be a legitimate entity, like a bank or credit card company. Their goal is typically to get you to click on a link in the email, which directs you to a Web site that appears to be that of the legitimate entity. You are prompted to enter sensitive information, and from that point onward, the information is in the hands of an attacker. Not only can he or she wipe your accounts clean, but that information can then...