



KPMG LLP  
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3975 Freedom Circle Drive  
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## Independent Accountant's Report

To the Management of Symantec Corporation:

We have examined the assertion by the management of Symantec Corporation ("Symantec") that for its Certification Authority (CA) operations at Mountain View, California, USA; New Castle, Delaware, USA; Dublin, Ireland; and Melbourne, Australia; and Cape Town, South Africa, throughout the period June 16, 2016 through November 30, 2016 for its STN, GeoTrust and Thawte CAs listed in Appendix A ("the STN, GeoTrust and Thawte Root and EV Code Signing Issuing CAs"), Symantec has:

- Disclosed its Extended Validation (EV) Code Signing Certificate practices and procedures in its:
  - Symantec Trust Network Certification Practice Statement, Version 3.8.26 dated September 9, 2016 ("STN CPS") and Symantec Trust Network Certificate Policy, Version 2.8.22, dated September 9, 2016 ("STN CP") on the Symantec website;
  - GeoTrust Certification Practice Statement, Version 1.1.19 dated, September 9, 2016 ("GeoTrust CPS") on Symantec's GeoTrust website; and
  - Thawte Certification Practice Statement, Version 3.7.16 dated, September 9, 2016 ("Thawte CPS") on Symantec's Thawte website

including its commitment to provide EV Code Signing Certificates in conformity with the applicable CA/Browser Forum Guidelines

- Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
  - EV subscriber information was properly collected, authenticated (for the registration activities performed by Symantec) and verified and
  - The integrity of keys and EV Code Signing Certificates it manages was established and protected throughout their life cycles

based on the WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – Extended Validation Code Signing v1.1 for the STN, GeoTrust and Thawte Root and EV CS Code Signing Issuing CAs.

Symantec's management is responsible for its assertion. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management's assertion based on our examination.

We conducted our examination in accordance with standards for attestation engagements established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and, accordingly, included:

- (1) obtaining an understanding of Symantec's EV CS certificate life cycle management business practices, including its relevant controls over the issuance, renewal, and revocation of EV CS certificates;
- (2) selectively testing transactions executed in accordance with disclosed EV CS certificate life cycle management practices;
- (3) testing and evaluating the operating effectiveness of the controls; and
- (4) performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.

We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.

The relative effectiveness and significance of specific controls at Symantec and their effect on assessments of control risk for subscribers and relying parties are dependent on their interaction with the controls, and other



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factors present at individual subscriber and relying party locations. We have performed no procedures to evaluate the effectiveness of controls at individual subscriber and relying party locations.

Because of the nature and inherent limitations of controls, Symantec's ability to meet the aforementioned criteria may be affected. For example, controls may not prevent, or detect and correct, error, fraud, unauthorized access to systems and information, or failure to comply with internal and external policies or requirements. Also, the projection of any conclusions based on our findings to future periods is subject to the risk that changes may alter the validity of such conclusions.

In our opinion, during the period June 16, 2016 through November 30, 2016, Symantec's management assertion, as referred to above, is fairly stated, in all material respects, based on the WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – Extended Validation Code Signing v1.1.

This report does not include any representation as to the quality of Symantec's services beyond those covered by the WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – Extended Validation Code Signing v1.1, nor the suitability of any of Symantec's services for any customer's intended purpose.

*KPMG LLP*

Certified Public Accountants  
Santa Clara, CA  
February 28, 2017

**APPENDIX A –STN, GeoTrust, and Thawte Root and EV CS Issuing CAs**

<p><b>STN Root CA:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5</li><li>• VeriSign Universal Root Certification Authority</li></ul> <p><b>GeoTrust Root CA:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority</li></ul> <p><b>Thawte Root CA:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• thawte Primary Root CA - G3</li></ul>	<p><b>EV Code Signing Issuing CAs:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Symantec Class 3 Extended Validation Code Signing CA</li><li>• Symantec Class 3 Extended Validation Code Signing CA - G2</li><li>• Symantec Class 3 Extended Validation Code Signing CA - G3</li><li>• Symantec SAS EV Code Signing CA</li><li>• thawte EV Code Signing CA</li></ul>
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**Assertion of Management as to  
Its Disclosure of its Business Practices and its Controls  
Over its Extended Validation Code Signing Certification Authority Operations  
During the period from June 16, 2016 through November 30, 2016**

February 28, 2017

Symantec Corporation ("Symantec") provides Extended Validation Code Signing (EV-CS) CA services through its STN, GeoTrust, and Thawte CAs listed in Appendix A ("the STN, GeoTrust and Thawte Root and EV Code Signing Issuing CAs").

The management of Symantec is responsible for establishing and maintaining effective controls over its EV CS CA operations; including its EV CS CA business practices disclosure on its Symantec website; EV CS key life cycle management controls; and EV CS certificate life cycle management controls. These controls contain monitoring mechanisms, and actions are taken to correct deficiencies identified.

There are inherent limitations in any controls, including the possibility of human error, and the circumvention or overriding of controls. Accordingly, even effective controls can only provide reasonable assurance with respect to Symantec's Certification Authority operations. Furthermore, because of changes in conditions, the effectiveness of controls may vary over time.

Management has assessed its disclosures of its certificate practices and controls over its EV CS CA services. Based on that assessment, in Symantec management's opinion, in providing its EV CS Certification Authority (CA) services at Mountain View, California, USA; New Castle, Delaware, USA; Dublin, Ireland; and Melbourne, Australia; and Cape Town, South Africa, throughout the period from June 16, 2016 through November 30, 2016, Symantec has:

- Disclosed its EV Code Signing certificate practices and procedures in its
  - Symantec Trust Network Certification Practice Statement, Version 3.8.26 dated September 9, 2016 ("STN CPS") and Symantec Trust Network Certificate Policy, Version 2.8.22, dated September 9, 2016 ("STN CP") on the Symantec website;
  - GeoTrust Certification Practice Statement, Version 1.1.19 dated, September 9, 2016 ("GeoTrust CPS") on Symantec's GeoTrust website; and
  - Thawte Certification Practice Statement; Version 3.7.16 dated, September 9, 2016 ("Thawte CPS") on Symantec's Thawte website

including its commitment to provide EV Code Signing Certificates in conformity with the applicable CA/Browser Forum Guidelines and

- Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
  - EV subscriber information was properly collected, authenticated (for the registration activities performed by Symantec) and verified and
  - The integrity of keys and EV Code Signing certificates it manages was established and protected throughout their life cycles

based on the WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – Extended Validation Code Signing v1.1 for its EV CS CAs.

Symantec Corporation

Roxane Divol  
EVP and GM, Website Security

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "RDX", is written over the printed name and title of Roxane Divol.

**APPENDIX A –STN, GeoTrust, and Thawte Root and EV CS Issuing CAs**

<b>STN Root CA:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5</li><li>• VeriSign Universal Root Certification Authority</li></ul> <b>GeoTrust Root CA:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority</li></ul> <b>Thawte Root CA:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• thawte Primary Root CA - G3</li></ul>	<b>EV Code Signing Issuing CAs:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Symantec Class 3 Extended Validation Code Signing CA</li><li>• Symantec Class 3 Extended Validation Code Signing CA - G2</li><li>• Symantec Class 3 Extended Validation Code Signing CA - G3</li><li>• Symantec SAS EV Code Signing CA</li><li>• thawte EV Code Signing CA</li></ul>
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