W32.Looked.E

1. Copies itself as %Windir%\Logo1_.exe.
   
   Note: %Windir% is a variable that refers to the Windows installation folder. By default, this is C:\Windows or C:\Winnt.
   
   
2. Checks for the value:
   
   "auto" = "1"
   
   in the registry subkey:
   
   HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Soft\DownloadWWW
   
   
3. If the entry is not found, the worm searches for and closes windows with the following properties:
   
   
   • Window title: RavMon.exe
     Window class name: RavMonClass
   • Window title: [CHINESE CHARACTERS]
     Window class name: Tapplication
   • Window title: [CHINESE CHARACTERS]
     Window class name: Tapplication
   • Window title: [CHINESE CHARACTERS]
     Window class name: TForm1
   • Window title: [VARIABLE TITLE]
     Window class name: TfLockDownMain
   • Window title: ZoneAlarm
     Window class name: ZAFrameWnd
     
     Note: The above windows may be associated with certain security-related products.
     
     
4. Ends the following processes:
   
   
   • EGHOST.EXE
   • MAILMON.EXE
   • KAVPFW.EXE
   • IPARMOR.EXE
     
     
5. Searches for the installation folder of the following security-related product:
   
   Mima Fangdao Zhuanjia Zongheban
   
   
   
   
6. Searches for the file PasswordGuard.exe, and for any .exe files whose name begins with a numeric character between 0 and 9 in the above folder. The worm ends any processes relating to these files.
   
   
7. Drops the following file:
   
   %CurrentFolder%\virDll.dll
   
   Note:
   • The above file may be a copy of Infostealer.Lemir.Gen.
   • %CurrentFolder% is a variable that refers to the folder where the risk was originally executed.
     
     
8. Injects virDll.dll into either IEXPLORE.EXE or EXPLORER.EXE.
   
   
9. Adds the value:
   
   "auto" = "1"
   
   to the registry subkey:
   
   HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Soft\DownloadWWW
   
   as an infection marker.
   
   
10. Downloads a file from [http://]vrnk774.nease.net/[REMOVED]/test/2.exe and saves it as %CurrentFolder%\1.exe. The worm executes %CurrentFolder%\1.exe.
    
    
11. Searches for .exe files to infect in all the drives form C to Y.
    
    The worm will not infect .exe files in the following folders:
    
    
    • system
    • system32
    • windows
    • Documents and Settings
    • System Volume Information
    • Recycled
    • winnt
    • Windows NT
    • WindowsUpdate
    • Windows Media Player
    • Outlook Express
    • Internet Explorer
    • ComPlus Applications
    • NetMeeting
    • Common Files
    • Messenger
    • Microsoft Office
    • InstallShield Installation Information
    • MSN
    • Microsoft Frontpage
    • Movie Maker
    • MSN Gamin Zone
      
      
12. Prepends itself to any .exe files that it locates on the computer. It changes the icon of infected files to the following icon of three floppy diskettes and a downward arrow:
    
    
    
13. Sends ICMP packet containing the string "Hello,World" to the following IP addresses:
    
    
    • 192.168.0.30
    • 192.168.8.1
      
      Note: It may also send ICMP packets to IP addresses in the same range as the IP address of the compromised computer.
      
      
14. If any computer responds to the ICMP packet, the worm attempts to open shared folders with the following names:
    
    
    • \\ipc$
    • \\admin$
      
      Note: The shared folder will have the user name "administrator" and a blank password.
      
      
15. If the worm succeeds in opening the shared folder, it copies itself to it.
    
    
16. Enumerates all the computers and shared folders in the local network. The worm uses a blank user name and a blank password to open the shared folders. The worm the searches for and infects .exe files in the shared folders.

Recommendations

Symantec Security Response encourages all users and administrators to adhere to the following basic security "best practices":

• Use a firewall to block all incoming connections from the Internet to services that should not be publicly available. By default, you should deny all incoming connections and only allow services you explicitly want to offer to the outside world.
• Enforce a password policy. Complex passwords make it difficult to crack password files on compromised computers. This helps to prevent or limit damage when a computer is compromised.
• Ensure that programs and users of the computer use the lowest level of privileges necessary to complete a task. When prompted for a root or UAC password, ensure that the program asking for administration-level access is a legitimate application.
• Disable AutoPlay to prevent the automatic launching of executable files on network and removable drives, and disconnect the drives when not required. If write access is not required, enable read-only mode if the option is available.
• Turn off file sharing if not needed. If file sharing is required, use ACLs and password protection to limit access. Disable anonymous access to shared folders. Grant access only to user accounts with strong passwords to folders that must be shared.
• Turn off and remove unnecessary services. By default, many operating systems install auxiliary services that are not critical. These services are avenues of attack. If they are removed, threats have less avenues of attack.
• If a threat exploits one or more network services, disable, or block access to, those services until a patch is applied.
• Always keep your patch levels up-to-date, especially on computers that host public services and are accessible through the firewall, such as HTTP, FTP, mail, and DNS services.
• Configure your email server to block or remove email that contains file attachments that are commonly used to spread threats, such as .vbs, .bat, .exe, .pif and .scr files.
• Isolate compromised computers quickly to prevent threats from spreading further. Perform a forensic analysis and restore the computers using trusted media.
• Train employees not to open attachments unless they are expecting them. Also, do not execute software that is downloaded from the Internet unless it has been scanned for viruses. Simply visiting a compromised Web site can cause infection if certain browser vulnerabilities are not patched.
• If Bluetooth is not required for mobile devices, it should be turned off. If you require its use, ensure that the device's visibility is set to "Hidden" so that it cannot be scanned by other Bluetooth devices. If device pairing must be used, ensure that all devices are set to "Unauthorized", requiring authorization for each connection request. Do not accept applications that are unsigned or sent from unknown sources.
• For further information on the terms used in this document, please refer to the Security Response glossary.