Pierre-Antoine Vervier

Pierre-Antoine Vervier is currently a Senior Principal Research Engineer at Symantec Research Labs. He obtained his Master's degree in Computer Science in 2010 from the University of Liège (Belgium). He obtained his Ph.D. from Telecom ParisTech (France) in 2014 on a topic related to the security of the Internet routing infrastructure.

Pierre-Antoine joined Symantec Research Labs in 2010. Between 2010 and 2013 he was involved in the European project VIS-SENSE. His research work has mainly been related to computer networks security. During his Ph.D. he designed and maintained for several years a real-time data collection and analysis infrastructure called SpamTracer for the study of attacks against the Internet routing (BGP hijacks). He is also actively working on the mining of large datasets for security intelligence and attack investigation.

Selected Academic Papers

  • Can I Opt Out Yet? GDPR and the Global Illusion of Cookie Control
    Iskander Sanchez-Rola, Matteo Dell’Amico, Platon Kotzias, Davide Balzarotti, Leyla Bilge, Pierre-Antoine Vervier, Igor Santos
    To appear at the 14th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM ASIACCS 2019)

    We evaluate both the information presented to users and the actual tracking implemented through cookies; we find that the GDPR has impacted website behavior in a truly global way, both directly and indirectly. On the other hand, we find that tracking remains ubiquitous.

  • IoT Security and Privacy Labels
    Yun Shen, Pierre-Antoine Vervier
    In Proceedings of the ENISA Annual Privacy Forum (APF 2019)

    We devise a concise, informative IoT labelling scheme to convey high-level security and privacy facts about an IoT device to the consumers so as to raise their security and privacy awareness.

  • Tiresias: Predicting Security Events Through Deep Learning
    Yun Shen, Enrico Mariconti, Pierre-Antoine Vervier, and Gianluca Stringhini
    In Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS 2018)

  • Mind your Own Business: A Longitudinal Study of Threats and Vulnerabilities in Enterprises
    Platon Kotzias, Leyla Bilge, Pierre-Antoine Vervier, Juan Caballero
    In Proceedings of the The Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2018)

  • Before Toasters Rise Up: A View Into the Emerging IoT Threat Landscape
    Pierre-Antoine Vervier and Yun Shen
    In Proceedings of the 21st International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses (RAID 2018)

  • Lean On Me: Mining Internet Service Dependencies From Large-Scale DNS Data
    Matteo Dell'Amico, Leyla Bilge, Ashwin Kayyoor, Petros Efstathopoulos, Pierre-Antoine Vervier
    In Proceedings of the 33th Annual computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2017)

    To assess the security risk for a given entity, and motivated by the effects of recent service disruptions, we perform a large-scale analysis of passive and active DNS datasets including more than 2.5 trillion queries in order to discover the dependencies between websites and Internet services.

  • Demystifying the IP Blackspace
    Quentin Jacquemart, Pierre-Antoine Vervier, Guillaume Urvoy-Keller, Ernst Biersack
    18th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses (RAID 2015)

    In this paper, we explore the misuse and abuse of the IP blackspace, a portion of the Internet IP address space that should not be used. We show that the IP blackspace is sometimes mistakenly used to host web services, such as, websites. We also show that cybercriminals exploit the blackspace to host malicious servers and launch attacks.

  • Mind Your Blocks: On the Stealthiness of Malicious BGP Hijacks
    P-A Vervier, O Thonnard, M Dacier
    2015 Network and Distributed Systems Security (NDSS) Symposium

    In this paper, we analyse 18 months of data collected by SpamTracer, an infrastructure specifically built to answer that question: are intentional stealthy BGP hijacks routinely taking place on the Internet? The identification of what we believe to be more than 2,000 malicious hijacks leads to a positive answer.