by Brian Hatch
|Overview of LIDS, Part Two
by Brian Hatch
last updated October 31, 2001
This is the second part of a four-part series devoted to an overview of LIDS, a Linux kernel patch that will allow users to take away the all-powerful nature of root in order to give programs exactly the access they need and no more. The first article in this series offered an overview of LIDS. This installment will look at file restrictions, LIDS File ACLs, and LIDS enhancements of Linux capabilities.
Linux supports two forms of file permission protection by default. The first are your standard Unix user/group/other permissions, set with the
user$ ls -l rotatweblogs -rwsr-xr-- 1 root web 14854 Sep 17 02:21 rotateweblogs
This file is owned by root:web, can be read by any user, run by any user in the group web, and will have superuser privileges when executed (in this case, presumably to send a USR1 signal to apache after rotating the log files.)
The second protection for files is based on the filesystem itself. For example the ext2 filesystem, the default for most Linux distributions, can set extended attributes with the
root# lsattr /var/log/messages -------- /var/log/messages root# chattr +a /var/log/messages root# lsattr /var/log/messages -----a-- /var/log/messages
Here we've set the 'append only' attribute to /var/log/messages. Other ext2 attributes include:
+i (immutable, cannot change or delete file) +s (file will have it's contents erased from disk when the file is deleted) +d (file cannot be archived with the dump command).
LIDS File ACLs
LIDS uses its own brand of ACLs directly in the kernel; they are integrated into the VFS (Virtual File System) layer, and thus do not depend on the filesystem type itself. This means that they could apply equally well to ext2, ext3, reiserfs, or even remotely-mounted partitions. (The ACLs enabled for remotely-mounted partitions would only apply to machines running LIDS, not to any other machines that mount the same filesystems.)
LIDS File ACLs are enforced as soon as the machine boots, and cannot be turned off unless you turn off LIDS entirely (lidsadm -S -- -LIDS_GLOBAL.) This can cause some headaches on machines with newly-installed LIDS until all the file ACLs are perfected.
There are four kinds of ACLs that LIDS can enforce on files. They are as follows:
LIDS ACLs can be placed on individual files, in which case the ACL applies to that file only, or on directories, in which case the ACL applies to all files in that directory recursively. The ACL can be defined with the
lfs# lidsadm -A -o /etc -j READ
(Remember, we must be in a LIDS Free Session to use the
root# echo "testing" > /etc/testing cannot create /etc/blah: Read-only file system
However, you can set additional ACLs if you wish as well to tailor the behavior of files in /etc, such as
lfs# lidsadm -A -o /etc/motd -j WRITE lfs# lidsadm -A -o /etc/shadow -j DENY
The more specific ACL takes precedence. Thus /etc/motd is available for writing even though /etc is read only. The file /etc/shadow is unavailable entirely, as we can see here:
root# echo "Testing" >> /etc/motd; tail -1 /etc/motd Testing root# ls -l /etc/shadow ls: /etc/shadow: No such file or directory
You may be wondering what purpose a hidden /etc/shadow serves. Sure, it means that even if a cracker gets root access they cannot read the password file and attempt to crack passwords. However, it also means that legitimate system programs such as login, sshd, and other authentication systems cannot verify passwords at all either. This is where LIDS ACL Subjects come into play.
In addition to specifying an object (/etc/shadow above,) you can specify a subject to the lidsadm command. If we want to make /etc/shadow unreadable except for sshd, we'd use the following two commands:
lfs# lidsadm -A -o /etc/shadow -j DENY lfs# lidsadm -A -s /usr/sbin/sshd -o /etc/shadow -j READ
This gives sshd permission to read the shadow file, and denies access to all other programs. Sshd still only has READ permission, not full WRITE permission, so we have given it just enough access to function as needed. You would use a similar command to give other authentication programs, such as login, sulogin, su, sudo, and vlock, READ access to /etc/shadow.
When faced with multiple rules that could apply to a specific access, LIDS picks the most specific. Thus in our shadow example we have three rules which are in use, from most specific to most general:
/usr/sbin/sshd has READ access to /etc/shadow. All files have no (DENY) access to /etc/shadow. All files have READ access to files in /etc.
Protect All Subjects
Say you have an object that is protected, to which you wish to give a program special access; for example, protecting all /var/log files, but giving sshd the ability to modify /var/log/wtmp:
lfs# lidsadm -A -o /var/log -j APPEND lfs# lidsadm -A -s /usr/sbin/sshd -o /var/log/wtmp -j WRITE
LIDS allows you to create the second rule only if /usr/sbin/sshd is also protected. If you're protecting everything in /usr or /usr/sbin, then you're fine already. However, if you are not that broad in your READ permissions, you would need to first protect sshd before you can create equivalent rules, as seen here:
lfs# lidsadm -A -o /var/log -j APPEND lfs# lidsadm -A -o /usr/sbin/sshd -j READ lfs# lidsadm -A -s /usr/sbin/sshd -o /var/log/wtmp -j WRITE
Since sshd is being given access to an otherwise protected file, LIDS requires that sshd also be protected.
Protect Your Filesystem Devices
Your filesystems are mounted from block devices in the /dev directory, such as /dev/hda1 or /dev/sda3. While the standard method to access them is through the mount point itself, it is still possible to read and write to the block device directly.
If someone can access the raw device files, they can circumvent the File ACLs enforced by LIDS. Thus it is important to prevent this. True, you're unlikely to find a script-kiddie smart enough to muck with your raw disks, but it's best not to underestimate the enemy.
You should remove the capability CAP_SYS_RAWIO from the bounding set by making sure that it starts with a '-' in lids.cap:
This automatically prevents any raw io access to devices. The only program you're likely to need that requires raw access to devices is your X server, in order to work with your video card and monitor, so if you need X make sure to grant it this capability:
lfs# lidsadm -A -s /path/to/X_server -o CAP_SYS_RAWIO -j GRANT
LIDS ACLs Are Inode-Based
If you look at the lids.conf file, you will notice the inode of the file being referenced, as well as the major and minor device number of the filesystem on which it resides. LIDS maintains the ACLs internally using the filesystem and inode number, rather than by the pathname itself.
This has both positive and negative effects. If you have a file with more than one hardlink, each file is protected with the exact same ACLs because they share an inode. However, it also means that changing a file's inode breaks the ACL association.
The most common time you will have inode changes are when programs are deleted and recreated (for example /etc/passwd may get copied, modified, and the new version installed after it is verified to be valid) or when software installations or upgrades are performed. In order to make sure that your ACLs are pointing to the correct files, you must upgrade the LIDS inode table when changes occur:
lfs# lidsadm -U
This updates the lids.conf file to match the current state of the filesystems and files being protected. In order to update the LIDS kernel data structures, make sure to reload the configuration files with
lfs# lidsadm -S -- +RELOAD_CONF
In traditional Unix models, the root user is all-powerful. An attempt was made to create a standard method of categorizing the various access checks, such as file permission override, network configuration, raw device access, and so forth, into a discrete set of groups called capabilities. A vendor-independent committee worked to standardize capabilities across Unix platforms in a draft designated POSIX 1003.1e. Unfortunately, the committee gave up and draft never became an actual standard.
Linux includes a variant of this capability model. Instead of checking for UID==0 in kernel access control checks, the kernel uses the 'capable()' call. This call will check the capabilities granted to a process to determine if it should have privileged access. The capabilities on a standard Linux kernel are listed here with a very brief explanation of the purpose. (For more detailed description, see /usr/include/linux/capability.h on your system):
In a default Linux kernel, all-powerful superuser ability is set up simply by granting all the above capabilities to any process that has uid/euid zero. All other processes do not have any capabilities set, and will be granted access based on standard Unix logic, such as file permissions and uid restrictions.
By default, all the capabilities are available to root-owned processes. However, capabilities can be removed from the kernel's capabilities bounding set itself. Doing so means that no processes can ever use that capability again until the machine is rebooted. This is a sure-fire way to remove some of the power of the root user that you can use even with standard Linux kernel. While this is one way to remove some of the power from root, it is a drastic one.
Lids Enhancements To Linux Capabilities
Lids extends the existing capabilities model in two distinct ways. As with a standard kernel, you can remove a capability from the capability bounding set, meaning that even uid/euid root programs cannot use that capability. However, it is not removed permanently, and you can turn it back on if needed.
The second difference is that you can grant or deny specific capabilities to processes on a program-by-program basis. This allows you to finely tailor the capabilities that will be available on your system.
The file /etc/lids/lids.cap lists the capability bounding set for the kernel. The format of the file is
[+-] #: Capability_Name
A snippet of this file may look like this:
-5:CAP_KILL +6:CAP_SETGID +7:CAP_SETUID +8:CAP_SETPCAP -9:CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE -10:CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
If the first character in the line is a '+' then the capability is left in the bounding set and processes that are running as root have the capability available. If the character is a '-' then it is not available to any processes. (The number after the + or - is simply the numerical equivalent of the named capability.)
So in the above example, no processes even running as root can use CAP_KILL, CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE, or CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE. Other capabilities are unaffected.
Capabilities Are Enforced At Sealing Time
The lids.cap file is not in affect when the machine is booted. This allows programs in /etc/rcX.d to run without any capability-related restrictions. Since files run at startup generally perform actions that require a variety of capabilities, it would be inconvenient to create exceptions to them all. Instead, the capability bounding set is enforced when the kernel is 'sealed' with the 'lidsadm -I' command (usually as the last thing run from /etc/rcX.d at bootup.)
Once the kernel is sealed, all capability restrictions from /etc/lids/lids.cap are put in effect. You can see the current bounding set using lidsadm as follows:
lfs# lidsadm -V VIEW CAP_CHOWN 1 CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE 0 CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH 0 CAP_FOWNER 1 ....
The '-V' option is only available if you compiled the lidsadm program with 'make VIEW=1'. Since it's no real security risk to allow this functionality, I prefer to compile lidsadm in this manner.
This concludes the second installment in this four-part series on LIDS. In the next installment, we shall continue the discussion of capabilities, looking particularly at granting capabilities and capability exceptions. We shall also look at setting ACLs and interpreting logs in LIDS.
To read An Overview of LIDS, Part Three, click here.
Brian Hatch is an obsessive security freak and lead author of Hacking Linux Exposed and co-author of Building Linux VPNs. While he frequently stays up late to write or hack code, he thinks it's much more fun to go to the park and push his daughter in the swing as he delivers horrible puns to his fiancee.
An Overview of LIDS, Part One
This article originally appeared on SecurityFocus.com -- reproduction in whole or in part is not allowed without expressed written consent.